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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a public debate on law and the colonial legacy has
engaged people of all walks of life in the English Speaking Caribbean
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(ESC), from judges and politicians to young people in the streets.
Throughout the ESC, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
(JCPC)—based in London and composed of British jurists—has been the
highest court of appeal since the colonial era.1 In the past decade, how-
ever, Caribbean governments have sought greater control over their legal
systems. In 2005, they created the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) to
supplant the British Privy Council as the Supreme Court for English-
speaking Caribbean nations.2 To date, three countries—Barbados, Belize,
and Guyana—have replaced the Privy Council with the Caribbean Court
of Justice. Although the Caribbean Court of Justice was originally pro-
posed and funded by Jamaica and Trinidad, their governments have yet to
accept it, and the JCPC still functions as their final court of appeal.3 Nu-
merous governmental debates have recently brought the issue to the fore-
front of political discourse. The question of whether to jettison the
JCPC—and adopt the Caribbean Court of Justice—in the ESC has raised
questions about the imposition of capital punishment, issues of self-deter-
mination, national politics, and human rights obligations. In short, the
court system has become a lightning rod for issues of national identity.
The British ruled the ESC as a colonizing power for over four hundred
years, beginning in the 17th century. During this time, the British imposed
their model of common law.4 The colonial power freely used corporal pun-
ishment and the death penalty to maintain discipline—and profits—in the
cane fields and sugar mills. Slaves were imported by the millions to toil on
the sugar plantations of the Caribbean.5 A highly stratified society of
1. See History, JUD. COMM. OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL, available at http://www.jcpc.gov.
uk/about/history.html (last visited June 23, 2013) (“The jurisdiction of the Privy Council
originated at the Norman conquest with the premise that: ‘The King is the fountain of all
justice throughout his Dominions, and exercises jurisdiction in his Council, which act in an
advisory capacity to the Crown.’ . . . Appeals from the Channel Islands became the first
regular appellate business of the King’s Council, now the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council. With the growth of the British empire, this business increased with appeals and
petitions from the Royal Council, and Privy Council Committees were formed”).
2. The Caribbean Court of Justice, CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM) SECRETA-
RIAT, http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/ccj.jsp?menu=community (last visited Oct. 10,
2013) (“The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is the regional judicial tribunal established by
the ‘Agreement establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice’. It had a long gestation period
commencing in 1970 when the Jamaican delegation at the Sixth Heads of Government Con-
ference, which convened in Jamaica, proposed the establishment of a Caribbean Court of
Appeal in substitution for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.”).
3. Role of the JCPC, JUD. COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL, http://www.jcpc.gov.
uk/about/role-of-the-jcpc.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (Commonwealth Antigua and Bar-
buda; Bahamas; British Indian Ocean Territory; Cook Islands and Niue (Associated States of
New Zealand); Grenada; Jamaica; St Christopher and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines; Tuvalu; the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago; the Commonwealth of Domi-
nica; Kiribati; Mauritius).
4. See CLINTON BLACK, THE HISTORY OF JAMAICA (1997); WILLIAM CLAYPOLE AND
JOHN ROBOTTOM, CARIBBEAN STORY, BOOK TWO: THE INHERITORS (1989). .
5. West Indies, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/
topic/640195/West-Indies (last visited June 23, 2013) (“The population of the West Indies is
ethnically heterogeneous and largely the legacy of an early plantation society based on slave
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planters and black slaves emerged.6 The plantation economy was big busi-
ness for the British, who understood that the “rule of law” was necessary
to protect their “property”7—slaves and fertile landholdings. Although
slave-owners had unchecked powers to punish their slaves, the British de-
veloped a colonial court system to hear disputes and punish criminals. The
JCPC was the region’s highest court, dictating policy and precedent that
affected thousands of lives. But even after the region’s independence in
the 1960s, the JCPC remained its highest court. Countries like Jamaica and
Trinidad still have their most important legal matters decided by judges in
London. The weight of the past has deeply shaped the present legal
system.
Today, many people in the ESC believe that the JCPC is a relic of the
colonial past and should no longer decide the nation’s most important ju-
ridical issues. Capital punishment, in particular, is a major point of con-
flict. The British originally used the death penalty to bolster their rule in
the ESC, but abolished the practice in 1971. Since then, the Privy Council
has imposed obstacles to the application of capital punishment, even
though it is written into the constitutions of numerous ESC countries and
based on considerable popular support. The British have narrowed appli-
cation of the death penalty in two ways: (1) by imposing a five year limit
on the time between sentence and execution throughout the ESC and (2)
striking down the death penalty as a mandatory punishment for murder in
Jamaica. Privy Council rulings that have addressed capital punishment
have been the subject of major controversy, leading many ESC citizens to
accuse the Privy Council of judicial imperialism. The irony is striking: an
imperial power, historically guilty of the fiercest punishment in maintain-
ing a system of bondage, has now abandoned the death penalty, while its
former colonies justify the punishment’s retention with self-
determination.8
A number of external factors have animated the debate on the Privy
Council. A recent surge in drug-related crime throughout the ESC has
labour. Most of the population is descended from African slaves or from Spanish, French,
British, or Dutch colonists or is of mixed ethnicity.”).
6. Id. (“The plantations and slavery created a hierarchical society based upon ‘racial’
distinctions and law. During the 17th century the major strata of West Indian society were
Europeans and their descendants (‘whites’)—who were generally free, though some were
indentured workers serving a period of contract labour—and enslaved Africans. By the 18th
century miscegenation had become more prevalent. Many children of mixed ethnicity were
manumitted (obtained their freedom), creating an intermediate stratum of free ‘people of
colour’ (persons of mixed ethnicity) and free ‘blacks’ (manumitted slaves of African descent).
By law and by custom, however, only whites enjoyed full civil rights; the free ‘mixed-race’
and black populations suffered many legal disabilities.”). Slaves—who included many mixed-
race persons by about 1800—were nonpersons, chattels to be bought and sold.
7. See JERRY DUPONT, THE COMMON LAW ABROAD: CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL
LEGACY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE xii (2000).
8. The right to self-determination is well documented in international law. See U.N.
Charter art. 1; U.N. Charter art. 37; G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No.
2, U.N. Doc. A/4494 (Dec. 14, 1960).
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increased popular support for the highest measure of punishment. Ja-
maica, for example, has become a transit point for the movement of drugs
between the Americas and Europe, a traffic that results in a great deal of
violent crime.9 A majority of the population supports the death penalty
for people convicted of capital murder and this overwhelming support has
led numerous Caribbean governments to withdraw from the Optional Pro-
tocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
Politicians have claimed that they were simply adjusting their human rights
obligations to reflect the interests of their constituents, but they have still
drawn fire from the international community for their actions.
Within the past few years, the Caribbean Court of Justice has emerged
as a viable alternative to the Privy Council. Many citizens and officials
argue that ESC countries should seek to resolve the controversy concern-
ing the application of the death penalty on their own terms, rather than
through the courts of their former colonial power. These advocates make
three major arguments in favor of adoption of the CCJ. First, the ESC
should have a distinct jurisprudence that reflects the history and values of
the region. Although the new court should respect the precedent set by
the Privy Council, it is crucial for the region to have institutions of its own.
Second, the cost of the CCJ is not prohibitive to the countries of the ESC.
In fact, the Privy Council is largely inaccessible due to the expense of its
appeals, a problem that could be solved by the adoption of the CCJ. Third,
Caribbean jurists are capable of doing a competent job, contrary to the
charges leveled by critics that the CCJ is too undeveloped and flawed to
assume the role of Supreme Court. Their appointment would not be par-
ticularly vulnerable to political pressure. Yet the CCJ remains a deeply
political issue: to date, the governments in Trinidad and Jamaica have not
been able to pass a special constitutional amendment designating the CCJ
as the final court of appeals.
It is important to stress from the outset that this Note does not ex-
amine the effectiveness of the death penalty as a practice. Although em-
pirical research speculates that capital punishment does not have a
deterrent effect on crime,10 the practice is not illegal under international
9. See CLAIRE RIBANDO SEELKE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41215, LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING AND U.S. COUNTERDRUG PRO-
GRAMS 18 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41215.pdf (“Because of their
geographic location, many Caribbean nations are transit countries for illicit drugs from South
America and the Caribbean destined for the U.S. and European markets. Currently, of the
16 countries in the Caribbean region, President Obama identified four—the Bahamas, the
Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica—as major drug-producing or drug-transit countries
in September 2010 pursuant to annual legislative drug certification requirements. Many other
Caribbean nations, particularly in the Eastern Caribbean, are also vulnerable to drug traf-
ficking and associated crimes because of their geographic location”).
10. See, e.g., RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 218-35
(1991); Michael Radelet & Traci Lacock, Do Executions Lower Homicide Rates?: The Views
Of Leading Criminologists, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489 (2009); Ronald J. Tabak & J.
Mark Lane, The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-of-Benefit Analysis of the Death
Penalty, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 59, 116-17 (1989); cf. Robert Tanner, Studies Say Death Pen-
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human rights law.11 Thus, this Note argues only that ESC countries should
determine their own practices of punishment through the CCJ.
Although the Privy Council has not come out against the death pen-
alty per se in the ESC, it has made it procedurally impossible to enforce. In
doing so, the Privy Council has created an untenable legal situation, clog-
ging the courts with multiple appeals that cannot be addressed within the
Privy Council’s mandated time limit. These rulings have created unfore-
seen and problematic consequences. First, they have had the unfortunate
effect of moving ESC countries away from their larger commitment to
human rights. Second, they have sparked a nationalist backlash with genu-
ine popular support. Indeed, this Note argues that replacing the Privy
Council with the CCJ would be the best way to resolve these issues at the
current time. It would allow the ESC to return to its larger human rights
commitments, increase local control over law in the region, and allow for a
genuine debate over the death penalty free of extraneous issues of na-
tional backlash.
This Note examines the debate surrounding the Privy Council and the
Caribbean Court of Justice, with a focus on the social and political ten-
sions related to the application of capital punishment. Part I reviews the
colonial history of the British Caribbean, including British methods of
governance, punishment, and law enforcement to create a hierarchical so-
ciety. Part II analyzes significant Privy Council decisions affecting the pro-
cedural aspects of the death penalty. Part III considers popular attitudes
toward violent crime and their effect on the human rights commitments of
ESC governments. Part IV surveys the major arguments in favor and
against the Caribbean Court of Justice—including the need for a Carib-
bean jurisprudence, cost factors, and the independence of the judiciary—
ultimately concluding that the CCJ is a preferable alternative to the Privy
Council.
I. COLONIALISM, LAW, AND METHODS OF GOVERNANCE
Between the 1620s and the 1960s, the British colonized many of the
Caribbean islands. They developed a plantation economy, built on slave
labor, to facilitate the production of sugar and its export to markets in
Europe. The British imposed their tradition of common law in the Carib-
bean colonies to adjudicate disputes and maintain the social order of a
slave society. The death penalty and corporal punishment were indispen-
sable tools to enforce the “rule of law.” The Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council (JCPC) was created to function as the ultimate court of ap-
peal for the region. After Caribbean colonies were granted independence
alty Deters Crime, WASH. POST (June 11, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con-
tent/article/2007/06/11/AR2007061100406.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
11. Harold Koh, the State Department’s former Legal Advisor, has insisted that capi-
tal punishment does not violate international law, telling the UN Human Rights Council:
“International human rights law does not bar it [the death penalty] per se.” Mark Tran, UN
Human Rights Council Urges US to End Death Penalty, GUARDIAN (Nov. 5 2010), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/05/un-council-urges-us-end-death-penalty.
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in the 1960s, newly-elected legislatures sought to maintain key British poli-
cies, such as use of the death penalty and appeal to the JCPC. Caribbean
nations also supplemented JCPC review with human rights agreements,
giving their citizenry the right to appeal to international institutions in cap-
ital cases.
This section aims to show the enormous impact of British colonialism
in the region, especially through the establishment of legal institutions and
traditions. Part A looks at British colonialism and the creation of the plan-
tation economy. Part B looks at the British imposition of common law in
the Caribbean, and use of the JCPC as the highest court of appeal. Part C
considers the role of ESC nations after independence in maintaining a
strong link to British policies of governance and legal institutions.
A. The Plantation Economy and Caribbean Slavery
In his essay, “The Muse of History,” famed St. Lucian author Derek
Walcott writes, “The common experience of the New World . . . is colonial-
ism.”12 The British ruled the English Speaking Caribbean (ESC) for over
350 years, beginning in 1624, when the first colonial settlement was estab-
lished in St. Kitts.13 They created additional settlements in Barbados
(1627) and Jamaica (1655), and fully colonized the rest of the region by the
end of the 18th century.14 The Dutch also began to colonize the region
during this time, creating settlements in countries like Guyana and Marti-
nique.15 There was fierce competition between colonial powers to control
the most fertile land, which was ideal for growing sugarcane. Countries
like Guyana, for example, were controlled by multiple colonial powers at
various points in its history. European powers systematically turned many
of the Caribbean islands into plantation economies,16 dedicated solely to
producing sugar (and in certain cases, cocoa) for export to Europe.
The islands of the Caribbean possessed fertile land and optimal cli-
mates for growing profitable cash crops. Historians have noted that there
was a “monoculture” of sugar production in Barbados, Jamaica, and
Guyana dating from the 17th century.17 In Trinidad, conversely, “cocoa
was king.”18 Sugar and cocoa cultivation in the New World created a pow-
12. DEREK WALCOTT, THE MUSE OF HISTORY (1974), reprinted in WHAT THE TWI-
LIGHT SAYS: ESSAYS 36 (1999).
13. Michael DaCosta, Colonial Origins, Institutions and Economic Performance in the
Caribbean: Guyana and Barbados 5 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 07/43, 2007).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. George Beckford, The Continuing Influence of the Plantation, in READINGS IN
CARIBBEAN HISTORY AND ECONOMICS 54, 59 (Roberta Marx Delson ed., 1981) (“Typically, a
plantation is a unit of agricultural production with a specific type of economic organization
characterized by a large resident labour force of unskilled workers who are directed by a
small supervisory staff.”).
17. Id.
18. ERIC WILLIAMS, HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 78 (1964).
Trinidad had a more varied economy than a lot of Caribbean countries, producing rum, cot-
Fall 2013] Courts of Appeal and Colonialism 219
erful demand for cheap labor, and the result was the explosion of the slave
trade. Harvesting sugarcane, in particular, required an extremely labor in-
tensive process. To produce large quantities of sugar it was necessary to
have not only a large labor force, but also one that worked tirelessly for
many hours on end.19 Slave labor was first brought from Brazil, a major
slave-trading hub, but was later imported directly from the coast of West
Africa. If slaves managed to survive the “Middle Passage”—the treacher-
ous journey from Africa to New World across the Atlantic—they could
expect to work under dangerous, backbreaking conditions in the Carib-
bean sugar plantations.20
By the 1750s, almost nine out of ten men and women in the Caribbean
islands were slaves on major sugar-producing plantations.21 A rigid system
of stratification existed to separate the white owners and managers from
the enslaved African workers.22 All plantations had certain features in
common: they were founded on relatively large land holdings; they em-
ployed many unskilled workers; decision making was centralized with the
white management; plantation governance was extremely authoritarian in
character; and the workers were separated from the managers by both so-
cial and cultural differences.23 The planter class regularly used violence to
enforce the separation between owner and slave. Despite the large num-
ber of slaves brought to the islands, life and work on the plantations was
so brutal that death rates were much higher than birth rates.24 One histo-
rian noted, “[s]ince Caribbean slaves died without reproducing them-
selves, the sugar estates could operate only by constantly importing
enormous numbers of new slaves.”25 Slaves, however, were not without
agency. They managed to resist their captors in numerous ways, including
organized rebellions,26 suicide, infanticide, and flight.27
With a comprehensively organized system of slave labor in place, the
economies of British-Caribbean colonies became entirely export-driven,
centered on the production of sugar.28 The British made enormous profits
ton, coffee, and cocoa in addition to sugar. Despite the different crop, Trinidad still had
plantations that were just as violent as the sugar plantations.
19. See RICHARD SHERIDAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLANTATIONS TO 1750 12
(1970) (“After a short period of uneasy friendship with the settlers, the Carib Indians were
exterminated, forced into bondage, or confined to certain islands in the Lesser Antilles.”).
20. See generally, MARCUS REDIKER, THE SLAVE SHIP (2008).
21. JAN ROGOZINSKI, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CARIBBEAN: FROM THE ARAWAK
AND THE CARIB TO THE PRESENT 122 (1992).
22. Beckford, supra note 16, at 59.
23. Id.
24. ROGOZINSKI, supra note 21, at 122.
25. Id.
26. The first plantation rebellion occurred in Barbados in 1649. J. H. PARRY & P. M.
SHERLOCK, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE WEST INDIES 71 (1956).
27. Id. at 72 (“[I]ndividuals could and did express their resentment in other ways: by
suicide, by infanticide, or by running away – especially in islands such as Jamaica where
mountains and forests offered shelter to fugitive groups.”).
28. Id.
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from the sugarcane industry, especially from Barbados, which became the
most profitable of the British colonies during the 17th century. At that
time, the island had a population of about 30,000 Europeans, about 11,000
of which were landholders.29 By the 18th century, the Caribbean was pro-
ducing 80 to 90 percent of the sugar consumed by Western Europe.30 His-
torians estimate that in the four centuries between 1550 and 1950, there
was a steady increase in per capita sugar consumption.31 Europeans, re-
gardless of their class background, drank tea, coffee, and cocoa, and ate
jams and candy.32 The massive profits from the sugar trade, in turn, bol-
stered the political power of the planter class in the Caribbean. Known as
the “West India Interest,” the planter class was strongly represented in
British parliament during the 18th and 19th centuries.33 The increasingly
powerful planter class sought to legitimate the violence of their economic
operations and needed a means by which to protect their stratified socio-
economic order. The British common law, with its emphasis on protecting
personal property, provided a powerful justification for colonial
operations.
B. The Privy Council34 and the Imposition of Common Law in
the Colonies
Colonial governments justified their conquest of foreign territories
and protected the “property rights” of white slave-owners by imposing
British models of common law. The English used two legal doctrines to
justify their conquest of “new” areas. The first was the Doctrine of Imposi-
tion. Applicable to conquered territories,35 the Doctrine of Imposition
gave the British legal support to “impose[ ] laws on the colonies in order
to control them.”36 The second was the Doctrine of Reception, which was
applicable to both settled and “uninhabited” territories.37 The Doctrine of
Reception provides: “[i]n case of settled territories, the settlers are pre-
sumed to have taken with them the English common law and statutes
which existed at the date of the settlement. But, it is not the whole body of
29. DaCosta, supra note 13, at 6.
30. See ROGOZINSKI, supra note 21.
31. Id. at 109.
32. Id. at 109.
33. Id. at 112 (“In 1776, Parliament had approximately forty members with some di-
rect relation to the West Indian planter class.”).
34. Throughout this note, the author refers to both the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council (JCPC) and the Privy Council interchangeably. The JCPC refers to the specific body
that handles appeals from the Caribbean and other former British colonies. Scholars and the
media often shorten the phrase simply to ‘the Privy Council.’
35. VELMA NEWTON, COMMONWEALTH LEGAL SYSTEMS: A STUDY OF SMALL JURIS-
DICTIONS 22-23 (1988).
36. Id. at 23.
37. Id.
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English law, which would have been applicable.”38 Together, the Doctrine
of Imposition and the Doctrine of Reception justified the first step of
colonialism: the takeover of foreign lands.
During the earliest years of British colonialism, judicial disputes were
usually referred to the Sovereign, who then referred them to the Privy
Council, a judicial body comprised of appointed legal scholars and practi-
tioners. In the 16th century, court systems were established in the British
colonies and it became common practice for parties to appeal their deci-
sions to the Privy Council.39 As the appeals practice evolved throughout
the 17th and 18th centuries, the British recognized the need for a specific
body to handle appeals coming from the colonies. The Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council (JCPC) was established by the Judicial Committee
Act, passed by British parliament in 1833.40 The legislation formally trans-
ferred judicial powers from the Privy Council to a specific judicial branch,
which would operate independently from the rest of the council.41
The Judicial Committee became an autonomous court of law, based in
London, deciding disputes on appeal from overseas territories.42 During
the colonial era, the JCPC functioned as the highest court of appeal for
many different colonies, including all of the Caribbean islands. The JCPC
derived its jurisdiction from the Sovereign of England possessing power
over all British subjects, at home or abroad.43 Professor Barry Gaspar,
originally from St. Lucia, believes that the colonial hierarchy of courts was
an important enforcement mechanism for the British.44 Within that frame-
work, the Privy Council “had a role to play in the way English governed
the Caribbean colonies. Governance was crucial to situating the em-
pire.”45 When laws were passed in the Caribbean, they had to be approved
by the colonial office or the colonial court system. This process made clear
that England was the center of power and “there was always a higher au-
thority than governments in the Caribbean.”46
The planter class and the British authorities actively used the death
penalty and corporal punishment to enforce the laws of their colonies. The
38. Id. But see 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *107 (limiting the scope of
the Doctrine of Reception by noting “Colonists carry with them only so much of the English
law as is applicable to their own situation and the condition of an infant colony . . . [W]hat
shall be admitted and what rejected, at what times, and under what restrictions, must, in case
of dispute, be decided in first instance by their own provincial judicature, subject to the revi-
sion and control of the King in Council.”.
39. JUD. COMM. OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL, supra note 1.
40. The Judicial Committee Act, 1833, ch. 41, (Eng.); Roget V. Bryan, Toward the
Development of Caribbean Jurisprudence: The Case for Establishing a Caribbean Court of
Appeal, 7 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 181, 183-184 (1998).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 184.
43. Id. at 183-84.
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most common forms were hanging and flogging.47 Plantation owners often
exercised their own forms of brutal punishment over slave populations,
but also had the option of allowing public authorities to try and punish
their slaves.48 As Anthony De V. Pillips describes,
In the case of non-capital offences, complaints were made to a
magistrate, but not upon oath. The magistrate summoned the
owner to produce the slave at the appointed time, together with
such persons as the complainant or the owner wished to give evi-
dence. After hearing the case, the magistrate either dismissed the
complaint or ordered a punishment of whipping according to the
offense. Such punishment varied from six to thirty-nine lashes.
Flogging was inflicted with the military cat (‘cat o’ nine tails’) be-
tween the shoulders.49
Capital offenses followed a similar process of presentation of evidence
before a magistrate, but the punishment was more severe: a sentence was
hanging by the neck until death.50
Anthony Bogues, a Professor of Political Thought at Brown Univer-
sity, grew up in Jamaica and completed his PhD at the University of West
Indies, Mona Campus. He believes that punishment was a critical part of
the British colonial project, which operated on two platforms.51 The first
platform was the colonial use of force to subjugate the slave population—
what Professor Bogues calls “might is right.”52 The second platform was
the colonial initiative to construct a different mental framework in “creat-
ing natives.”53 The disparity between a slave—a piece of property—and a
“respectable Victorian subject” was enormous, justifying the binary con-
struction of a slave society.54 This physical and emotional violence consti-
tuted “power in the flesh.”55 Colonial punishments such as the death
penalty, flogging, and imprisonment were crucial to the development of
legal systems in the Caribbean.
The planter class and the colonial administration agreed that the “rule
of law” was crucial for maintaining a slave society. Most of the time they
agreed on how to enforce this “rule of law,” but in certain instances they
did not. For example, in the early 19th century, the two groups were at
47. Anthony De V. Phillips, Doubly Condemned: Adjustments to the Crime and Pun-
ishment Regime in the Late Slavery Period in the British Caribbean Colonies, 18 CARDOZO L.
REV. 699, 714-15 (1996).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 712.
50. Id.
51. Telephone Interview with Anthony Bogues, Professor of History, Brown Univer-
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odds over “proper” methods of governance. In 1807, the British abolished
the trans-Atlantic slave trade and began advocating for a more patriarchal,
religiously-influenced philosophy of governance.56 Indeed, the abolition of
the slave trade helped to raise life expectancy rates and improve medical
and nutritional standards for slaves.57 Administrators in London urged co-
lonial legislatures to convert their slaves to Christianity and to provide
them with moral instruction.58 London Administrators encouraged plant-
ers to use the whip more sparingly and mitigate the violence of the slave
trade. But planters still had “virtually untrammeled power over their
slaves,” a power they did not want to relinquish.59
Despite their philosophical differences, the two groups were able to
unite their political agendas to keep slave classes disenfranchised. In 1865,
the British enacted the Colonial Laws Validity Act, which gave a substan-
tial amount of autonomy to colonies to regulate their own affairs.60 His-
torians have criticized the Act for its veiled attempt to keep the white
planter class in power, fearing the spread of “black rule.”61 The Act did
not expand suffrage to the entire citizenry and sought to keep in place
political institutions that were governed by the planter class.62 Jamaica, for
example, did not enjoy universal suffrage until 1944.63 Historian Gordon
Lewis argues that race hierarchy and fear of black rule “lay at the heart of
British policy.”64
After the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade in 1807, the
planter class found it increasingly difficult to keep the plantation economy
as profitable as it once was.65 The massive importation of slaves meant
that whites were a small minority population in the Caribbean. The de-
scendants of African slaves began to accumulate political influence and
become involved more heavily in governance. By the 1950s, the British
56. Phillips, supra note 47, at 702-03.
57. Id. at 702.
58. See id. at 703.
59. Id. (“The tension within the amelioration debate essentially arose from planter
resistance against attempts to impose controls on what had been virtually untrammelled
power over their slaves.”).
60. ANN SPACKMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST INDIES, 1922-
1968 64 (1975) (stating that the Colonial Laws Validity Act did make it explicitly clear, how-
ever, that these new powers were still subordinated to the ultimate power of Westminster
Parliament).
61. Margaret A. Burnham, Indigenous Constitutionalism and the Death Penalty: The
Case of the Commonwealth Caribbean, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 582, 589 (2005).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. GORDON K. LEWIS, THE GROWTH OF THE MODERN WEST INDIES 107 (1968).
65. Despite the abolition of the slave trade, serious inequalities persisted. See West
Indies, Encyclopedia Britannica, supra note 5 (“The persistence of the plantation system and
of white elitism, bolstered by colonialism, shored up the structure of the grossly inegalitarian
societies of the West Indies after emancipation. Colour-class and culture-class correlations
persisted in a situation where—excepting the French West Indies from the late 19th cen-
tury—democracy was systematically denied”).
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knew that independence for many of their colonies was inevitable.66 The
British originally united a number of the Caribbean islands into one coun-
try, the Federation of the West Indies, to which they would then grant
independence.67 The Federation of the West Indies included Jamaica, Trin-
idad, Barbados, and other islands in the Windward and Leeward parts of
the Caribbean.68 The Federation collapsed after four years, however, as
larger countries like Jamaica and Trinidad voiced their disapproval at a
constitutional convention held in London in 1961.69 The larger countries
were not convinced of the benefits they would receive from participation
in the federation, and shortly thereafter decided to draft their own inde-
pendence constitutions.70 Trinidad and Jamaica both became independent
in 1962, and other countries followed throughout the 1960s.
C. Legacies of the British: The Death Penalty, the JCPC, and
Human Rights
As independence movements gained momentum throughout the En-
glish-Speaking Caribbean (ESC) in the 1950s, emerging nations were
charged with creating constitutions and bodies of law in order to establish
self-rule. Many countries sought to adopt a modified version of the West-
minster system of parliamentary democracy, which was created by the
British.71 Liberal democratic structures became the standard throughout
the ESC, illustrating the full influence of the former colonizing power.72
ESC governments sought to maintain many of the most powerful practices
of the colonial state, including the death penalty. Even though capital pun-
ishment was once used to reinforce the stratification of slave societies,
66. A number of social and economic factors led to eventual decolonization. Id. (“By
this time labour disturbances were about to break out throughout the region, a consequence
of the Great Depression and the lack of means for democratic dissent; popular demands for
development and decolonization were spreading from Jamaica to Trinidad. Most of the West
Indian societies were decolonized with imperial consent after World War II—by a grant of
full independence, as in the case of most of the British territories, or by incorporation into
the mother country, as in French-affiliated islands of the Lesser Antilles, or through their
association with the colonial power, as in the former Netherlands Antilles and some of the
British territories.”).
67. See generally, ELISABETH WALLACE, THE BRITISH CARIBBEAN: FROM THE DE-
CLINE OF COLONIALISM TO THE END OF FEDERATION (1977).
68. Originally included in the Federation of the West Indies were the sovereign states
of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. The islands, which
are still British protectorates, included the Virgin Islands, Anguilla, Montserrat, the Cayman
Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands.
69. See WALLACE, supra note 67, at 185-91.
70. Id. at 192-214.
71. But many ESC countries departed from the Westminster model in adopting ‘Bill of
Rights’ to supplement constitutional authority, showing that newly independent nations de-
sired to have an explicit grant of judicially enforceable rights, as opposed to protection stem-
ming only from the common law. Burnham, supra note 61, at 596.
72. Id.
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ESC countries sought to retain the practice as the ultimate punishment for
the most severe offenses.
The governments of Trinidad, Jamaica, and Barbados were just a few
examples of former colonies that chose to keep the death penalty as
mandatory punishment for the crime of murder. The mandatory death
sentence was written into the constitution of each country as part of a
“saving clause,” a legal inheritance of state punishment from the former
colonial power.73 In Jamaica, Section 2(1) of The Offences against the Per-
son Act provides, among other things, that “persons convicted of capital
murder shall be executed.”74 In Trinidad and Tobago, capital punishment
was retained in ‘The Offences Against the Person Act of Trinidad and
Tobago.’ Section 4 of the Act (Chapter 11:08) states: “Every person con-
victed of murder shall suffer death.” This means that individuals who in-
tentionally commit homicide receive the death sentence.75 The Statute
cites no difference between first and second degree murder, or between
voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.76 Judges and juries are not al-
lowed to consider any “pertinent circumstances” involved in the homi-
cide,77 in contrast to death penalty laws in the United States.78 Lower
courts have been particularly harsh in imposing this sentence, leading
some scholars to maintain that the death penalty is “automatically
imposed.”79
ESC nations that utilize the JCPC as the final court of appeals, includ-
ing Trinidad and Tobago, also provide defendants domestic avenues for
appeal in capital cases. The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court for smaller
countries like Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and three British overseas territories
73. See Leonard Birdsong, The Formation Of The Caribbean Court Of Justice: The
Sunset Of British Colonial Rule in the English Speaking Caribbean, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 249 (2005).
74. Stephen Vasciannie, The Lambert Watson Decision, JAMAICA GLEANER (July 12,
2004), http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20040712/cleisure/cleisure2.html.
75. Brian Angelini, Trinidad and Tobago’s Controversial Death Penalty Law: A Note
on Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin v. Trinidad & Tobago, 10 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 361,
363 (“[O]n a more specific level, the death penalty statute in Trinidad & Tobago is quite
distinct from that of the U.S. Indeed, these distinctions are not only conspicuous, but they
reveal potentially unconscionable terms in Trinidad & Tobago’s death penalty law.”).
76. Id. at 364.
77. Id. (“Evidence that defendants may have acted under the influence of drugs, or
who may have acted under extreme emotional distress after, for instance, witnessing spouses
in compromising situations with adulterous lovers, are both circumstances in which such facts
might be declared inadmissible.”).
78. Id. at 389 (“In summary, there are two notable distinctions between the death
penalty in Trinidad & Tobago and that of the United States. The most conspicuous is the
failure to distinguish between varying degrees of murder that renders the death penalty laws
in Trinidad & Tobago cruel and unusual punishment because they punish an individual dis-
proportionately to the severity of the crime he committed. Second, Trinidad & Tobago’s fail-
ure to require a trial within a reasonable time period further exacerbates the deplorable
conditions endured by defendant while confined to their prison cells. . .”).
79. Id. at 363.
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function in a similar way. These national courts of appeal usually have
unlimited jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters.80 After the national
appeals court renders its decision, the defendant can file a “petition for
special leave” to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.81
The Privy Council hears individual matters in five (or nine) judge panels.
It is quite difficult for a defendant to be heard at the JCPC, which is often
thought of as a court of last resort.
Defendants in capital cases can also apply to two international bodies
that serve the ESC: the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR)
and the United Nations Human Rights Committee (Human Rights Com-
mittee). The IACHR is a judicial body that was created by the American
Convention on Human Rights of 1969.82 All Caribbean nations, except for
Cuba, are members of the OAS. For the court to adjudicate the disputes, a
state that is a party to the OAS must be accused of a human rights viola-
tion, and that state must accept the court’s jurisdiction.83 As it stands, Ha-
iti is the only country that accepts jurisdiction of the court in all
contentious cases; the rest of the Caribbean countries accept jurisdiction
on an ad hoc, case-specific basis.84 The Human Rights Committee also
hears petitions on human rights abuses in capital cases. Unlike the IACHR
or the JCPC, the Human Rights Committee is not a court, but rather a
group of experts that consider state reports on compliance with the
ICCPR.85 The Committee reviews complaints alleging compliance with
the ICCPR.86 Both the Human Rights Committee and the IACHR have
played a large role in the process of considering death penalty appeals in
the Caribbean, as the next section will show.
II. PRIVY COUNCIL CASES ON THE DEATH PENALTY
Since the 1970s, the Privy Council has heard a number of important
death penalty cases. Its rulings have had an enormous impact on the capi-
tal appeals process. In particular, Privy Council opinions have addressed
two major procedural issues: (1) the amount of time that can elapse be-
tween a death sentence and an execution and (2) whether the death pen-
alty is mandatory when an individual is convicted of capital murder. This
section aims to show that there is significant tension between the Privy
Council and Caribbean governments on the issue of the death penalty.
The Privy Council, an English court, has essentially defined death penalty
80. Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN
STATES,  http://www.oecs.org/about-the-oecs/institutions/eastern-caribbean-supreme-court-
ecsc (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).
81. Id.
82. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 34,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention].
83. Id. art. 62.
84. Id.
85. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
adopted Dec. 19, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, 303 [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
86. Id. at 302.
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jurisprudence for the Caribbean, creating enormous friction with national
governments over their rights to enforce criminal laws. Section A exam-
ines the issue of delay between sentence and execution, with a focus on the
ruling in Pratt and Morgan v. Attorney General of Jamaica. Section B ana-
lyzes the debate over whether the death penalty should be automatically
imposed for defendants convicted of capital murder.
A. Delays Between Sentence and Executions
The debate between the JCPC and national governments on the appli-
cation of the death penalty dates back to the 1970s. In 1975, Michael Frei-
tas (aka Michael Abdul Malik or Michael X) was sentenced to death for a
double-murder on a commune in Trinidad. Freitas challenged the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty on two different grounds.87 First, he argued
that capital punishment was, per se, a cruel and unusual punishment. Sec-
ond, he argued that the enormous lapse of time between sentence and
execution in Trinidad made it unconstitutional to execute anyone.88 Al-
though Freitas was ultimately convicted and put to death, he was the first
defendant to raise serious constitutional questions about the death penalty
for the Privy Council to consider.89 Less than four years later in 1979, the
case of Abbott v. Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago raised similar
questions about delays in execution.90 Abbott, also convicted of murder,
challenged his death sentence on the grounds that six years had elapsed
between his conviction and his date of execution. The Privy Council once
again upheld the death sentence even though it stated the massive delay
“brings the administration of criminal justice into disrepute among law
abiding citizens.”91 The court held that six years was not long enough to
qualify as too long, although it stressed that there should not be an “enor-
mous” length of time between sentence and execution.92
The decision in Abbott paved the way for Riley v. Attorney-General of
Jamaica in 1983, a case that prompted even greater reservations than its
predecessor.93 Riley challenged the application of the death penalty on the
grounds that five to six years had elapsed between his sentence and pro-
posed date of execution. The Privy Council, in a close and controversial
decision, held 3-2 that delay alone could “afford no ground for holding the
execution to be a contravention of the relevant Section (17) of the Jamai-
can Constitution.”94 But the two dissenting judges, Lord Scarman and
87. De Freitas v. Benny, [1976] A.C. 239 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago).
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. Abbott v. Attorney Gen. of Trin. & Tobago, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1342 (P.C.) (appeal
taken from Trin. & Tobago).
91. David Simmons, Conflicts of Law and Policy in the Caribbean-Human Rights and
the Enforcement of the Death Penalty – Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 9 J. TRANSNAT’L
L. & POL’Y 263, 267 (2000).
92. Abbott, supra note 90.
93. Riley v. Attorney Gen. of Jam., [1983] 1 A.C. 719 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.).
94. Simmons, supra note 91, at 267-68.
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Lord Brightman, laid the groundwork for the Privy Council’s next decision
on the matter: “Prolonged delay when it arises from factors outside the
control of the condemned man can render a decision to carry out the sen-
tence of death an inhuman and degrading punishment.”95
These three cases set the stage for one of the most important Privy
Council decisions in Pratt and Morgan v. Attorney General of Jamaica. In
1979, Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan were sentenced to death in Jamaica for
the crime of murder.96 Their appeal to the Jamaican Court of Appeal was
dismissed in December of 1980. In 1986, their petition for special leave to
appeal to the Privy Council was refused.97 Their execution was scheduled
for March 7, 1991.98 Pratt and Morgan then filed an appeal arguing that
imposing a death sentence after a fourteen year delay, during which they
were held in “subhuman” prison conditions, would constitute a violation
of Section 17(1) of the Constitution of Jamaica, which prohibited “inhu-
mane and degrading punishment.”99
Over the course of their imprisonment, the appellants had death war-
rants read to them three times. They were also moved to “dead man cells”
close to the gallows in anticipation of execution.100 The two men pursued
appeals through a number of different tribunals and organizations, includ-
ing the Human Rights Committee and the IACHR.101 The Human Rights
Committee, after doing some fact finding of its own, found that the Jamai-
can Court of Appeal breached the ICCPR. The Human Rights Committee
stated that the delay of forty-five months had violated Article 5 of the
ICCPR, which guarantees the right to be tried “without undue delay.”102
The failure of the Jamaican prison authorities to promptly inform the ap-
plicants about the stay of their execution also contravened Article 7 of the
Covenant. The IACHR decided that the applicants had unfairly endured
over four years on death row, in violation of Article 5(2) of the American
Convention, which prohibits “torture and ill treatment.” In 1987, the In-
ter-American Commission requested that the executions “be commuted
for humanitarian reasons.”103
After a considerable amount of procedural wrangling, the Privy Coun-
cil finally heard the appeal in 1993. The Privy Council held that an uncon-
scionable delay in carrying out a death sentence violated 17(1) of the
Jamaican Constitution.104 The Privy Council commuted the death
95. Id., at 267-269.
96. Bryan, supra note 40, at 188.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 188-89.
100. Id. at  189-90.
101. Id. at 188-89.
102. Barry Phillips, Case Note, Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney Gen. for Jam., 2 A.C. 1
(1993), 88 AM. J. INT. L. 775, 776-77 (1994).
103. Id.
104. Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney Gen. for Jam., [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) (appeal taken
from Jam.).
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sentences of Pratt and Morgan to life imprisonment. In its ruling, the Privy
Council established a two year period for completing the domestic appeals
process.105 National courts would have twelve months to hear a capital
appeal following conviction, and then there would be another twelve
months allotted for an appeal to the Privy Council.106 The Court also man-
dated that there should be only a five year gap between sentence and exe-
cution, with all appeals included.107 Lord Griffiths expressed the
unanimous conclusion of the seven members of the Privy Council:
In their lordships’ view a State that wishes to retain capital pun-
ishment must accept the responsibility of ensuring that execution
follows as swiftly as practicable after sentence, allowing a reasona-
ble time for appeal and consideration of reprieve. It is part of the
human condition that a condemned man will take every opportu-
nity to save his life through use of the appellate procedure. The
total period of delay is shocking and now amounts to almost four-
teen years. It is double the time that the European Court of
Human Rights considered would be an infringement of article 3 of
the European Convention on Human Rights and their lordships
can have no doubt that an execution would now be an infringe-
ment of section 17(1) of the Jamaican Constitution. To execute
these men now after holding them in custody in an agony of sus-
pense for so many years would be inhuman punishment within the
meaning of section 17(1). The delay in this case is wholly unac-
ceptable and this appeal must be allowed.108
The result of this ruling was felt in criminal justice systems throughout
the ESC. Jamaica immediately commuted the death sentences of all pris-
oners that had been on death row for more than five years. In Trinidad,
fifty-three death row inmates had death sentences commuted since more
than five years had elapsed since the original sentence,109 while Barbados
commuted nine such cases.110 Throughout the ESC, national courts of ap-
peal had to table the resolution in order to concentrate on hearing capital
murder appeals.111
The ruling in Pratt also had several unanticipated consequences for
capital cases. Tribunals found their dockets inundated with death row ap-
peals, inadvertently causing a delay in reviewing petitions that exceeded
105. Id.
106. Bryan, supra note 40 at 189.
107. Id. at 189-90.
108. Id.; see also Dennis Morrison, The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the
Death Penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean: Studies in Judicial Activism, 30 NOVA L.
REV. 403 (2006).
109. Bryan, supra note 40, at 190.
110. Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory
and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash against Human Rights, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1832, 1872 (2002).
111. Id.
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the five-year limit established in Pratt. The number of death row petitions
grew from between three to fifteen per year between 1989 and 1993 to
twenty-two to twenty-eight per year between 1994 and 1999.112 One au-
thor notes that by simply exhausting all domestic and appeals processes,
capital defendants could “effectively force Caribbean governments to
commute their death sentences. The result was a near de facto abolition of
the death penalty in Caribbean states subject to the Privy Council’s juris-
diction . . . .”113 The court in Pratt sided with the minority opinion in Riley,
and with their ruling effectively overturned Abbott and Riley.114 The effect
of the ruling was to bind all Caribbean common law countries to the Privy
Council’s interpretation of the restrictions on the death penalty. Carib-
bean governments responded strongly to the ruling and its consequences,
soon coming to view the Privy Council and human rights tribunals as ob-
stacles to imposing capital punishment.115
In cases that followed, the Privy Council ruled that the time lapse
should be even shorter than five years. In Guerra v. Baptiste, the Privy
Council ruled that the five-year limit imposed in Pratt was not the “limit,”
but that cases should be considered on an individual basis.116 In Guerra,
the delay was four years and 10 months, which still amounted to “cruel
and unusual punishment” and a violation of the constitution of Trini-
dad.117 Like Pratt, Guerra illustrated the tension between the Privy Coun-
cil and national courts. A confrontation between the Privy Council and the
Trinidad and Tobago Court of Appeal soon followed in the wake of the
appeal.118 The Privy Council staunchly defended its role in the process of
appeal, noting that if the defendants had been executed before their right
of appeal was completely exhausted it would constitute “the gravest
breach of constitutional rights.”119 One author argued that the effect of
the Privy Council’s decision showed an “unflattering lack of confidence in
the local Court of Appeal and encroachment on the local Court’s exercise
112. Id. at 1875 (“This increase was not spread evenly across the two tribunals, how-
ever. The Human Rights Committee received the over-whelming majority of cases filed in
1995 and 1996, whereas the Inter- American Commission received the bulk of the cases filed
between 1997 and 1999.”).
113. Id. at 1879.
114. Simmons, supra note 91, at 270-271. (“The court in Pratt therefore sided with the
minority view in Riley and, in effect, overruled Abbott and Riley. . . Governments were
therefore mandated to improve their criminal justice systems or face the prospects of mur-
derers escaping the hangman’s noose.”).
115. See Helfer, supra note 110, at 1880.
116. Guerra v. Cipriani Baptiste (Trin. & Tobago) [1995] UKPC 3 (appeal taken from
Trin. & Tobago).¶29. The ruling in Pratt “was not intended to provide a limit, or a yardstick,
by reference to which individual cases should be considered in constitutional proceedings”.
117. Id. ¶32.
118. Bryan, supra note 40, at 192. (“That action by the Privy Council produced an em-
barrassing confrontation between the Judicial Committee and the Trinidad and Tobago Court
of Appeal.”).
119. Id.
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of discretion through a blatantly inappropriate assumption of
jurisdiction.”120
B. Is the Death Penalty a Mandatory Punishment for Murder?
The issue of delayed executions was not the only procedural matter
addressed by the Privy Council. The Court also confronted major ques-
tions as to whether the death penalty could serve as a mandatory punish-
ment for murder. In 2002, three cases – one each from Belize, Saint Kitts
and Nevis, and Saint Lucia – reached the Privy Council on appeal from the
Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal (ECCA). Known as the “Trilogy
Cases,” the ECCA ruled on appeal that that the constitutions of these
countries did not render the death penalty mandatory.121 Further, no leg-
islation from any parliamentary body in these three countries made the
death penalty mandatory. The Privy Council upheld the lower court’s rul-
ing, arguing that the mandatory exercise of the death penalty amounted to
inhuman and degrading treatment.122
The Privy Council’s ruling in the “Trilogy Cases” set the stage for a
major legal battle over the mandatory death penalty in Jamaica, Trinidad,
and Barbados. All three countries had specific constitutional provisions,
with different iterations, mandating that individuals convicted of capital
murder should be put to death. Known as “saving clauses,” these constitu-
tional provisions enshrined British practices, like the mandatory death
penalty, into the law of newly-independent Caribbean nations. In Lambert
Watson v. The Queen, the Privy Council addressed the “saving clause” in
Jamaica’s constitution.123 The defendant in that case had been convicted
of the non-capital murder of his wife and daughter, whom he killed at the
same time. The Privy Council, applying dicta from the “the Trilogy Cases”
concluded that the mandatory imposition of the death penalty violated the
applicant’s constitutional protection against cruel, inhuman, or degrading
punishment, since it deprived him of “the opportunity to show why the
120. Id. Other cases following Pratt also addressed access to human rights bodies for
capital cases. In Henfield v. Attorney General of the Bahamas (1997), the Privy Council ruled
that a delay of three and a half years could also violate the constitution of the Bahamas. In
the Bahamas, unlike Jamaica, there was no right of petition allowed to the Human Rights
Committee or the IACHR. See Henfied v. Att’y Gen. of the Bah., App. Case 413 (P.C. 1996).
The court later recognized that individuals still could petition the Inter-America Commission
about alleged violations of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.
Fisher v. Minister of Pub. Safety & Immigration, [1998] A.C. 673, at para. 41 (P.C. 1997)
(appeal taken from Bah.).
121. The Trilogy Cases consisted of Reyes v. The Queen [2002] 2 W.L.R. 1034, [2002[
U.K.P.C. 11, [2002] 2 A.C. 235 (appeal taken from Belize); The Queen v. Hughes [2002] 2
W.L.R. 1058, [2002] U.K.P.C. 12, [2002] 2 A.C. 259 (appeal taken from St. Lucia); and Fox v.
The Queen [2002] 2 W.L.R. 1077, [2002] U.K.P.C. 13, [2002] 2 A.C. 284 (appeal taken from
St. Kitts & Nevis).
122. Anthony Gifford, The Death Penalty: Developments in Caribbean Jurisprudence,
37 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 196, 201 (2009).
123. Watson v. The Queen, [2004] 3 W.L.R. 841, [2004] UKPC 34 (appeal taken from
Jam).
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sentence of death should not be passed on him” on the basis of “the facts
of the case, personal background, and circumstances.”124 The court cited
Section 17(1) of the Jamaican Constitution, which states that no person
shall be subject to torture or inhuman or degrading punishment or other
treatment. In the Lambert Watson Case, the State argued that there were
specific social conditions in Jamaica which should differentiate it from St.
Kitts, St. Lucia, and Belize.125 In particular, the high rate of murder and
drug trafficking required mandatory death sentencing. The Privy Council
rejected this argument.126
The Privy Council did not accept the Jamaican government’s “saving
clause” argument either. The court’s ruling examined the validity of Sec-
tion 3(1A) of the Offenses Against Person Act of 1864, which imposes the
death penalty on a defendant convicted of non-capital murder if before
that conviction he or she had already been convicted of murder. The Court
noted that Jamaica had amended its pre-independence law on the death
penalty in 1992 and, therefore, the mandatory death penalty rules under
consideration were not part of a pre-independence law.127 In other words,
they were not “saved” by Section 26(8) of the Constitution. After Lambert
Watson, sixty sentences of death were commuted.128 The Privy Council
was clearly uncomfortable with the mandatory death penalty, believing
that it did not allow convicted defendants to be treated with humanity and
dignity.129 The effect of the Lambert decision was that judges were asked
to hear evidence and other considerations that might impact the process of
sentencing.
In Charles Matthew v. the State (Trinidad)130 and Lennox Recardo
Boyce v. the Queen (Barbados),131 the Privy Council found that the
mandatory death sentence could be applied in these two countries because
their “saving clauses” had not been amended. During the trial, the Gov-
ernment of Trinidad and Tobago (hereinafter Trinidad) was a strong advo-
cate for mandatory imposition of the death penalty.132 Trinidad Attorney
John Jeremie made it clear that the Privy Council should uphold the
mandatory exercise of the death penalty. Breaking from the decision in
Lambert, the court ruled 5-4, in favor of upholding the mandatory death
penalty. The majority ruled that the constitutions of Trinidad and Barba-
dos included a “saving clause” which allowed the countries to keep the
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Stephen Vasciannie, The Lambert Watson Decision, JAMAICA GLEANER (July 12,
2004), http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20040712/cleisure/cleisure2.html.
127. Bryan, supra note 40.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Matthews v. State, [2004] UKPC 12 (appeal taken from Trin.).
131. Boyce v. The Queen, [2004] UKPC 99 (appeal taken from Barb.).
132. Francis Joseph, State Wants Mandatory Death Sentence, TRIN. & TOBAGO NEW
BULL. BOARD (Dec. 21 2003), http://www.trinidadandtobagonews.com/forum/webbbs_config.
pl/noframes/read/1330.
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British practice because it was established law before independence.133
The UNHRC and the IACHR have both ruled that the mandatory death
penalty, in any situation, was inconsistent with human rights obligations
under international law.134 The mandatory death penalty should therefore
be considered a violation of international law, though not domestic law.
In Matthews, the JCPC overruled precedent from Balkisoon Roodal v.
The State.135 The holding in Roodal originally struck down the mandatory
death sentence in Trinidad, explicitly noting that capital punishment
should be discretionary, not mandatory.136 The holding in Matthews re-
versed course, stating that the mandatory death sentence was constitu-
tional on the basis of the saving clause in both the Trinidadian and
Barbadian constitutions (Sections 6-1 and 26 respectively) which exempt
any laws in existence before the entry into force of the Constitution from
being declared subsequently unconstitutional.137 The Court concluded
that this was a matter for the parliament of the two countries to decide,
rather than the court. This was despite the fact that all parties (including
the State) argued that they amounted to “cruel and unusual punish-
ment.”138 The Court stated:
“The Offences Against the Person Act was passed in 1925, replac-
ing earlier similar legislation. It therefore cannot be invalidated by
anything in sections 4 or 5. As the Constitution contains no other
provisions which can affect its operation or validity, it follows that
if one is concerned only to construe the Constitution as the su-
preme law of Trinidad and Tobago, there is no basis for chal-
lenge. . . As a consequence, the majority concede that the death
penalty must be regarded as existing law and, therefore, the
mandatory death sentence must continue to form part of the law
of Trinidad and Tobago and, in the process, there can be no chal-
lenge against that.”139
The JCPC did accept, however, that those currently sentenced to death
should benefit from Roodal and as a result, 100 prisoners were
reprieved.140
In the wake of these decisions, a large controversy erupted over the
powers of the Privy Council to affect governance in the Caribbean.
Vasheist Kokaram, an attorney-at-law in Trinidad and Tobago, argued in a
133. See Gifford, supra note 122, at 201.
134. It will likewise not be consistent with the current interpretation of various human
rights treaties to which Trinidad and Tobago is a party.
135. Matthews, supra note 130 at 67.
136. Roodal v. State, [2003] UKPC (appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.; see also Hamid Ghany, Will the Privy Council Decide?, TRINIDAD GUARDIAN
(July 18 2004), http://legacy.guardian.co.tt/archives/2004-07-18/HamidGhany.html.
140. Id.
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newspaper editorial that the decisions of Charles Matthew, Lambert Wat-
son, and Lennox Recardo Boyce “transcend just criminal law and raise
questions of huge constitutional significance as to the meaning of our su-
preme law.”141 Legal commentators have noted a contradiction in the
court’s different treatment of constitutional law in Jamaica on the one
hand, and Trinidad and Barbados on the other:
There is irony in this result. Jamaica sought to improve its death
penalty law in 1992, and now finds that this improved law has
been struck down. Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados have done
nothing to amend the law. . . and these laws remain valid because
they are saved.142
The ESC legal community was also upset that the court refused to ac-
knowledge the surging rates of violent, drug-related crime. Although the
court tried to be sympathetic to these concerns in the Lambert Watson
opinion, it made clear that the rising tide of violent crime could not affect
their reasoning:
We mention one last matter. In the Court of Appeal and in argu-
ment much emphasis was laid on the very high incidence of mur-
der and the widespread use of firearms in Jamaica. These facts are
well known to the Board and are, regrettably, notorious . . . But
prevailing levels of crime and violence, however great the anxiety
and alarm they understandably cause, cannot affect the underly-
ing legal principle at stake, which is that no one, whatever his
crime, should be condemned to death without an opportunity to
try and persuade the sentencing judge that he does not deserve to
die.143
III. THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL POLITICS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
Throughout the ESC, administration of the death penalty has been
shaped by trends in crime and popular attitudes toward punishment. Al-
though the British used the death penalty as a tool of colonization, they
abolished the practice in 1971. Since then the Privy Council has limited the
ability of ESC countries to apply the death penalty in landmark cases like
Pratt and Lambert Watson. Yet despite changes in the British approach,
the death penalty still has strong support throughout the ESC, especially
as a means to punish violent drug-traffickers. To understand the entire
spectrum of views on “justice” and “punishment” in the ESC, one must
consider the political climates of Jamaica, Trinidad, and Barbados. Strong
141. Vasheist Kokaram, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death, TRIN. & TOBAGO NEWS-
DAY (Aug. 2 2004), http://www.newsday.co.tt/news/0,20488.html.
142. Vasciannie, supra note 126, at 2.
143. Watson, [2004] 3 W.L.R. 841, [2004] UKPC 34.
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local support for the death penalty among citizens of all class positions has
created a climate hostile to the Privy Council and its rulings imposed from
outside the country. In the wake of Pratt and Lambert Watson, popular
support for the death penalty led certain Caribbean countries to withdraw
support of human rights agreements, including accession to the Optional
Protocol of the ICCPR and the American Convention on Human Rights.
Part A examines the scope of drug-related violence in the Caribbean and
popular opinion toward capital punishment. Part B analyzes the effect of
local opinion on the decision of Caribbean governments to denounce their
human rights obligations.
A. Popular Attitudes toward the Death Penalty and Effects of
Drug-Violence
Throughout the Caribbean, only the English-speaking countries have
insisted on using the death penalty in their criminal justice system. The
practice was made illegal in the French and Dutch Antilles, Haiti, and the
Dominican Republic.144 In Cuba, executions have not occurred since
2003.145 But despite the positions of close neighbors and countries of ori-
gin, capital punishment still has strong popular support throughout the
ESC. Scholars have noted that the “vast majority” of people in these coun-
tries support the death penalty in “appropriate cases.”146 In fact, a survey
conducted by Systems Caribbean Limited found that well over 80% of
residents in Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago support use of the death
penalty.147
What can explain such high rates of popular support? The rising crime
rate, especially crime associated with drug violence, is partly responsible.
Beginning in the 1980s, crime rates in the ESC skyrocketed. Government
officials saw two primary causes for the growth of violent crimes: (1) the
general decline in the region’s economic growth; and (2) the activity of
South American drug cartels in using ESC countries as transshipment
points for drugs bound for the United States.148 A number of Caribbean
nations, most notably Jamaica, had unofficial moratoria on the death pen-
alty, but executions were resumed in response to the rising tide of vio-
lence.149 The surging number of violent crimes led to a massive increase in
death sentences and executions. In 2005, the death row population in the
ESC was approximately four times that of the United States.150
144. Gifford, supra note 122, at 198.
145. Id.
146. Simmons, supra note 91, at 266.
147. Id.
148. IVELAW LLOYD GRIFFITH, DRUGS AND SECURITY IN THE CARIBBEAN: SOVER-
EIGNTY UNDER SIEGE 53-92 (1997).
149. Burnham, supra note 61, at 601 (“Until the 1980s, when a dramatic increase in
homicide in the region led to its revived popularity with the electorate, the death penalty was
used so infrequently as to amount to a virtual moratorium. But violent crime skyrocketed
beginning in the 1980s, and so, too, did the number of death sentences and executions.”).
150. Id.
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Jamaica and Trinidad were two of the nations hardest-hit by the drug
trade. The abundance of drug money has fueled drug-related corruption in
both countries. According to the UN’s INCB Report, corruption has
increasingly weakened the criminal justice systems in . . . the Car-
ibbean. Corruption, including among police and other law en-
forcement officials, has interfered with the ability of States in the
region to promote development, blocking the delivery of services
and distorting public spending.151
While Jamaica has a long history of drug-related violence and problems
continuing to the present day, Trinidad has experienced a more recent
spike in such violence.152 The island has also become a major hub for arms
smuggling and money laundering in recent years. Geographically speak-
ing, Trinidad occupies a prime location for the smuggling of contraband,
since it is only seven miles off the coast of Venezuela, a prominent drug
transit point in South America. Further, Trinidad has a comparatively
well-developed banking and transportation infrastructure, which allows
drug dealers to funnel money and product through the country with ease.
In August of 2011, the Trinidadian Prime Minister, Kamla Persad-Bisses-
sar, declared a nationwide state of emergency after 11 people were killed
in four days.153 She linked the crime surge to major police seizures of nar-
cotics, which were valued in excess of $20 million, noting that such “large
sums of money do not just disappear from the drug trade without conse-
quences.”154 Terrific violence traumatized numerous neighborhoods in
Port of Spain, the capital City of Trinidad. The state of emergency was
extended from August into September, and was finally lifted only in the
beginning of December.155 Despite the curfew, Trinidad, a nation of only
1.3 million, reported more than 350 homicides in 2011.156
Jamaica’s history as a desirable location for drug smuggling reaches
back much further. Jamaica is known for the growth and export of Canna-
bis, which travels to many countries in North and South America.157 Like
151. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., ANNUAL REPORT, at ¶ 382, U.N. Doc. E/
INCBW/2011/1, U.N. Sales No. E.12.XI.5 (2011) [hereinafter INCB REPORT], available at
http://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2011/AR_2011_E_Chapter_
III_Americas.pdf.
152. Reshma Ragoonath, PM Declares Limited State of Emergency, GUARDIAN MEDIA
(Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/08/22/pm-declares-limited-state-
emergency.
153. Reshma Ragoonath, PM Declares Limited State of Emergency, GUARDIAN MEDIA
(Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/08/22/pm-declares-limited-state-
emergency.
154. Id.
155. Michael Coleman, Jamaica, Trinidad Battle Violence as Drug Smuggling Plagues
Caribbean, DIALOGO NEWS (Sept. 1 2012), http://dialogoamericas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/
features/regional_news/2012/01/09/aa-caribbean-violence.
156. Id.
157. Congressional Research Service Report, supra note 9, at 1 (“Cannabis is cultivated
in virtually all countries in the region, mainly for local consumption, but notable cannabis
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Trinidad, Jamaica’s geographical makeup is advantageous to drug smug-
glers. The country has 638 miles of coastline and is accessible via airplane
and speedboat.158 Drugs are transported through way stations on the coast
or moved to the Bahamas before being trafficked to Europe or the United
States. Guns and ammunition are also trafficked through Jamaica, along
with migrants and prostitutes.159 The flourishing drug market in Jamaica
has transformed the country into one of the most dangerous nations in the
world and taken a fatal toll on the local population. In 2010, Jamaica had a
homicide rate of 52 per 100,000, qualifying the country as the fourth most
violent in the world.160 The same year, Jamaica made headlines when the
United States ordered the extradition of Kingston drug boss Christopher
“Dudus” Coke on drug trafficking and gun smuggling charges. After some
initial recalcitrance, Jamaica waged a manhunt for Coke, which ended in
73 civilian deaths.161 Much of the fighting took place in Tivoli Gardens, a
vast shantytown—or “garrison” as it is called in Jamaica. Coke was highly
influential in the area, which was a haven for the operation of his gang,
known as the “Shower Posse.”162 The incident prompted Jamaica to de-
clare a temporary state of emergency.
Citizens of the ESC have passionately expressed their support for ex-
acting “appropriate” justice on the perpetrators of violent crime. As noted
previously, administration of the death penalty is carried out through
hanging.163 The public response to violent crime has become so impas-
sioned that “[r]ecently in Jamaica a pastor put his name forward to fill the
post of hangman, an act that even advocates for the death penalty found
disturbing.”164 Popular support for retributive justice has urged corporal
punishment in addition to application of the death penalty. For example,
in the Bahamas the legislature responded to a crime wave by passing harsh
penalties for crime. The practice of flogging was reinstated in 1991 (though
abolished three years later) to serve as a deterrent to drug related
crime.165
exporters include Mexico and Jamaica. Drug processing and refining may take place in
source zones as well as along transit routes.”).
158. Dave Eberhart, Jamaica Sees Jump in Cocaine Seizures Since Dudus Extradition in
2010, DIA´LOGO (Mar. 6, 2013) http://dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/re-
gional_news/2013/06/03/jamaica-drugs (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
159. INCB REPORT, supra note 151, at 50.
160. Coleman, supra note 155.
161. Jason Beaubieu & Corey Flintoff, Drug Violence Tarnishes Jamaica’s Paradise Im-
age, NPR NEWS (May 26 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1
27130637.
162. Id. (“The gang’s name is said to come from a Labour Party election slogan promis-
ing to shower Jamaicans with benefits, but it also is said to be a reference to the gang’s ability
to shower enemies with bullets.”).
163. Leonard Birdsong, The Formation Of The Caribbean Court Of Justice: The Sunset
Of British Colonial Rule in the English Speaking Caribbean, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
197, 203 (2005).
164. Gifford, supra note 122, at 197.
165. Burnham, supra note 61, at 582.
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The popularity of the death penalty also extends beyond class bounda-
ries in the ESC, making it politically expedient. Government officials, le-
gal elites, and working class people all share “a strong preference for
capital punishment as a way to deter the region’s persistently high violent
crime rate.”166 Since the death penalty is popular with major political do-
nors as well as the wider population of ESC countries, politicians have
been reluctant to uphold human rights obligations over the state’s right to
execute criminals. According to the Attorney General of Trinidad and To-
bago, “the legality of the death penalty was an essential condition of Car-
ibbean participation in human rights regimes.”167 Scholars have
speculated that for countries attempting to balance respect for human
rights agreements and local views, the latter currently outweighs the for-
mer: “In the end, the regional preference for capital punishment was
strong enough to outweigh the weaker preference for maintaining commit-
ments to constitutional and human rights systems that effectively incorpo-
rated abolitionist norms.”168
History Professor David Johnson is originally from Trinidad and To-
bago. He grew up in a working class community called Morvant, located
just outside of the Port of Spain area.169 Today, he says that Morvant is
one of the “centers of gun violence.”170 He notes that if one were to walk
the streets of Morvant, talking to people outside their homes, there would
be no shortage of citizens who say the state should “string them [criminals]
up.”171 But according to Professor Johnson, there is not enough public
education about the practice of capital punishment.172 Amid rates of rising
crime, it becomes easy to resort to supporting the death penalty. The
Trinidadian government has not facilitated an open and creative public
discussion about the practice. Johnson states that instead of conducting
“straw polls” about the death penalty, the government could show leader-
ship and encourage a dialogue.173 One of the things that must be ad-
dressed in this dialogue is the class implications of the death penalty.
Almost all death penalty cases involve the “downtrodden classes”—the
main perpetrators and victims of violent crime. There is a serious need for
political leaders to “step out of the fray” to address class division, drug
crime, and its relation to capital punishment.174
166. Helfer, supra note 110, at 1886.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1887 (“Supporting this conclusion is the fact that two of the three denounc-
ing states immediately sought to reaffirm their treaty commitments for human rights unre-
lated to capital punishment.”).
169. Telephone Interview with David Johnson, Professor of History, City College, City






Fall 2013] Courts of Appeal and Colonialism 239
B. The Human Rights Obligations of Caribbean Governments
Popular support for the death penalty in the Caribbean at present dif-
fers fundamentally with European jurisprudence on the topic. For de-
cades, European judicial bodies have had strong reservations about the
use of the death penalty by countries in the Americas. In the 1989 case of
Soering v. United Kingdom et al., the European Court of Human Rights
addressed the “Death Row Phenomenon,” which is often defined by seri-
ous delay in execution following sentencing, as well as the grim conditions
of detention imposed upon inmates, signifying that all attempts at rehabili-
tation have failed.175 In Soering, the European Court on Human Rights
refused to extradite an individual, convicted of murder, from the United
States to stand trial on a first degree murder charge.176 The court ruled
that it could not extradite the individual unless extradition was accompa-
nied by an assurance from the U.S. that the death penalty would not be
imposed. While the court stopped short from deeming the death penalty
itself as inhuman or degrading,177 the court did note that delays and mis-
treatment of prisoners often constitute a violation of Article 3 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights.178
As is evidenced by the rulings in Pratt and Lambert Watson, the JCPC
shares these reservations toward application of the death penalty. But the
rulings in these two cases have placed ESC governments in a difficult posi-
tion. One author argues that the JCPC’s decisions and attitude on interna-
tional human rights has placed ESC countries “between a rock and a hard
place.”179 First, democratically-elected politicians in countries like Jamaica
and Trinidad must represent the views of their constituents. Second, the
constraints imposed by the JCPC in Pratt have placed considerable pres-
sure on the two international bodies capable of hearing death penalty ap-
peals—the Human Rights Committee and the IACHR. These bodies have
found themselves unable to process all of the many appeals they receive
within the strict five-year window designated by Pratt.180 For death row
inmates who want to exhaust the appeals process, which now includes re-
course to a national appeals court, human rights bodies, and the JCPC, it is
175. William A. Schabas, Soering’s Legacy: The Human Rights Committee and the Judi-
cial Committee of the Privy Council Take a Walk down Death Row, 43 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
913, 913 (1994).
176. Id.
177. Id. (“The Court stopped short of holding the death penalty itself to be inhuman
and degrading, although one judge, Jan De Meyer, adopted such views in his concurring
reasons.”).
178. Schabas, supra note 175, at 914.
179. Simmons, supra note 91, at 282 (“The law is a mess! It has taken the Judicial Com-
mittee of the Privy Council, our highest court, almost six years to confess that their decisions
and the attitude of the international human rights have truly placed our countries “between a
rock and a hard place.”).
180. Id. (“The Republic, in common with other Caribbean countries, found itself in an
impossible position”).
240 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 35:213
nearly impossible to complete this process without significant delay to the
execution.
In response to the rulings in Pratt and Lambert Watson, Trinidad and
Tobago and Jamaica withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR.181 Both countries re-acceded to the Protocol with a reservation
for all cases involving the death penalty.182 The Optional Protocol pro-
vides “international machinery for dealing with communications from in-
dividuals claiming to be victims of violations” of the rights that are listed
in the Covenant, meaning that it is serves as the enforcement mechanism
for human rights in the ICCPR.183 It is unfortunate that the Caribbean
countries felt they had to implement this reservation, because they were
among the first signatories to the ICCPR. Jamaica signed the ICCPR, in
1966, and then ratified the agreement in 1975.184 Trinidad ratified the
treaty in 1978 following revision of its constitution. Jamaica then ratified
the Optional Protocol in 1975, while Trinidad did in 1980.185 Both coun-
tries demonstrated their commitment to the international treaty before
many countries did in the 1990s. The two countries took a slower approach
to adopting the rules of the Inter-American Commission, partly because
the OAS was originally created with only the participation of Latin
America and not the Caribbean.186 The contentious issue of the death
penalty has thus forced the Caribbean countries to retreat from human
rights pledges that they once willingly and enthusiastically endorsed.
The reasoning of the Trinidadian and Jamaican governments is that
they are unable to apply the death penalty in accordance with the Op-
tional Protocol. The two governments believed it impossible to comply
with the five-year window imposed by Pratt, finding the five-year limit an
unrealistic mandate.187 Trinidad also withdrew fully from the American
Convention on Human Rights, effectively withdrawing its participation in
the IACHR. The Inter-American Court no longer has jurisdiction to con-
sider individual human rights violations originating in Trinidad.188 Law
professor Laurence Helfer argues that Jamaica and Trinidad withdrew
from their human rights obligations and jurisdiction from international
tribunals for two reasons. First, the two countries resented the judicial im-
perialism of the JCPC in Caribbean death penalty matters. Second, the
withdrawal from human rights agreements can be understood as a “re-
sponse to the overlegalization of the governments’ human rights commit-
ments.”189 According to Helfer, there are three important instances of
181. Helfer, supra note 110, at 1864.
182. Id.
183. Morrison, supra note 108, at 415.
184. Helfer, supra note 110, at 1864.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. It is worth noting that the United Kingdom, the United States, and other Carib-
bean states are not signatories to the Optional Protocol.
188. Simmons, supra note 91, at 285.
189. Helfer, supra note 110, at 1832.
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overlegalization in this case. First, the Privy Council set in motion a con-
tradictory ruling in Pratt by creating a five-year window for executions but
refusing to allow executions while human rights petitions or appeals were
pending. Second, it “increased the treaties’ precision by particularizing the
content of the degrading punishment norm shared both international and
domestic instruments.” Third, it urged states to collaborate with human
rights organizations and encouraged defendants to file petitions with these
organizations, resulting in an outcome that would likely result in the com-
mutation of their sentences.190 Helfer writes, “Seen from this perspective,
the legalization of international commitments is not unambiguously good,
and overlegalized treaty regimes may pose particular dangers.”191
The Privy Council has had a generally positive relationship with the
international human rights bodies in the ESC. The Privy Council even
took measures to discourage Jamaica from discontinuing its member-
ship.192 But the Privy Council also urged the tribunals to complete review
of all applications within eighteen months, while noting that the process
should speed up considerably once delays were resolved at the national
level.193 Scholars have criticized the Privy Council for these exhortations,
noting that the Privy Council was uninformed about the way that human
rights institutions function. The two tribunals simply do not have the ca-
pacity to review cases with any haste, since they meet only a few times a
year and are stretched to the limit with crowded dockets.194 Thus, al-
though ESC countries recognize the need to honor their human rights
commitments, the rulings of the Privy Council have made it difficult for
them to do so.
IV. THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE
PRIVY COUNCIL
In the wake of escalating drug violence and controversy over the
human rights obligations of ESC Countries, the Caribbean Court of Jus-
tice (CCJ) has been debated as a suitable alternative to the Privy Council.
Application of the death penalty has served as a flashpoint, but it should
be examined within the context of other philosophical and practical con-
siderations regarding the adoption of a new, regional court of appeals.
190. Id. at 1891-92.
191. Id. at 1837.
192. Id. at 1873 (“The court expressed a generally positive view of the tribunals’ roles in
reviewing death row petitions. Notwithstanding the fact that the tribunals’ decisions were not
legally binding, the court took pains not to ‘discourage Jamaica from continuing its member-
ship of these bodies and from benefiting from the wisdom of their deliberations,’ and urged
that their decisions ‘be afforded weight and respect’ by the government.”).
193. Id. at 1874.
194. Id. (“Both of these predictions were based on a misperception of how human
rights petition procedures function. As for the time required to review death row petitions,
the court in Pratt failed to recognize the tribunals’ institutional incapacity to review cases
quickly. The tribunals are part-time bodies which meet only a few times per year and manage
an increasingly crowded docket with inadequate material and financial resources.”).
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Three major factors have framed this debate: the importance of a dis-
tinct Caribbean jurisprudence; the comparative financial costs and accessi-
bility of the CCJ and the Privy Council; and the partiality of Caribbean
judges compared with their counterparts in England. This Section, consid-
ers each of these factors in turn and argues that the CCJ is a preferable
alternative to the Privy Council.
Part A analyzes the idea of Caribbean Jurisprudence and the legacy of
British colonialism, arguing that if adopted, the CCJ has the potential to
balance preservation of Privy Council precedent with new judicial inter-
pretations that reflect the history and values of the Caribbean people. Ad-
dressing capital cases would be a major component of this balance. Part B
examines the costs associated with both the CCJ and the Privy Council to
show that the former is a financially feasible proposition. Part C argues
that there would not be a loss of judge partiality after a switch to the CCJ.
A. The Importance of a “Caribbean Jurisprudence”
In the decade following independence, economic and judicial integra-
tion of the ESC was a top priority for Caribbean nations.195 Critics of the
JCPC maintained that a Caribbean Court was necessary to replace the
JCPC, which they viewed as a colonial institution established to protect
the interests of the white planter class.196 Independence leaders were ea-
ger to develop a Caribbean jurisprudence–through a regional Supreme
Court–that reflected the history and values of its population. The Carib-
bean Court of Justice (CCJ) was conceived in 1970, when a political dele-
gation from Jamaica to the Sixth Heads of Government Conference
proposed an independent Caribbean court to replace the Privy Council.197
In 1974, the Caribbean Task Force re-affirmed the message of the Jamai-
can delegation, arguing that a Caribbean Court of Appeal represented the
final step in the independence process: “independence imposes an obliga-
tion on sovereign nations to be the architects of their own destiny. To ful-
fill this obligation, the people must in turn create their own
institutions.”198
ESC countries envisioned a Caribbean Court of Appeals as an exten-
sion of their regional economic community. A regional trading block,
known as the Caribbean Community and Common Market (“CAR-
ICOM”), was established in 1973 when heads of Caribbean governments,
including Jamaica, Trinidad, Guyana, and Barbados among others, signed
the Treaty of Chaguaramas.199 CARICOM replaced the Caribbean Free
195. Bryan, supra note 40 at 206.
196. David Rowe, Op-Ed: Is Now the Time for the Caribbean Court of Justice, CARIB-
BEAN J. (Sept. 15, 2012), http://www.caribjournal.com/2012/09/15/op-ed-is-it-time-for-the-car-
ibbean-court-of-justice.
197. The Caribbean Court of Justice, CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY SECRETARIAT, (Oct.20,
2000), http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community_organs/caribbean_court.jsp?menu=cob.
198. Bryan, supra note 40, at 206.
199. The Original Treaty, CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY SECRETARIAT, (2011), http://www.
caricom.org/jsp/community/original_treaty.jsp?menu=community.
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Trade Association.200 In addition, the Treaty sought to address issues of
foreign policy coordination and inter-state cooperation.201 The Treaty was
revised in 1997 through the Revised Treaty Establishing the Caribbean
Community Including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy
(CSME).202 Today, there are twelve full members of both CARICOM and
CSME.203
In the same year, ten countries signed the Agreement Establishing the
Caribbean Court of Justice.204 The court was given two primary functions.
The first was to serve as a final court of appeal for the ESC. The CCJ was
envisioned to be a final replacement for the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council as the ultimate court of appellate jurisdiction for both crimi-
nal and civil matters. It is the highest municipal court in the region. The
second function was to serve as an international court with original juris-
diction for the region. The CCJ is vested with the right of original jurisdic-
tion to interpret the Treaty of Chagamuaras. States with the Caribbean
Community (signatories of the Caricom treaty) are supposed to utilize the
court to settle major inter-state disputes.205 Scholars have characterized
the CCJ as having a “hybrid nature”–since it has both original and appel-
late jurisdiction–which contributes to regional integration into a global le-
gal framework.206
Despite the promise of the CCJ, only three countries adopted it as
their Supreme Court: Barbados, Guyana, and Belize. Jamaica and Trini-
dad, two of the earliest and strongest advocates for a Caribbean court, still
have not been able to change their constitutions to adopt it. The Honora-
ble Rolston Nelson, a judge on the CCJ, believes that this is due to the
high level of political support needed to change a country’s constitu-
tion.207 For example, in Trinidad, three quarters of the House of Repre-
sentatives and two thirds of the Senate must support adoption of the
CCJ.208 Nonetheless, the current prime ministers of Trinidad and Jamaica,
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Birdsong, supra note 163, at 201-02.
203. The full members are Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Gre-
nada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. The Bahamas and Haiti are full members of CARICOM
but not the CSME. See THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, The CCJ: from Concept to
Reality (2012) http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/about-the-ccj/ccj-concept-to-reality
(last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
204. The original signatories included ten states: Antigua & Barbuda; Barbados; Belize;
Grenada; Guyana; Jamaica; St. Kitts & Nevis; St. Lucia; Suriname; and Trinidad & Tobago.
Dominica and St. Vincent and the Grenadines joined the agreement less than two years later
in 2003. Id.
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Kamla Persad-Bissessar and Portia Simpson Miller, respectively, have an-
nounced that the countries will switch over to the Caribbean Court of Jus-
tice.209 Following the 50th anniversary of Jamaica’s independence from
Britain, Miller stated that it was time to “end judicial surveillance from
London.”210 The opposition Jamaican Labor Party has been skeptical of
the CCJ and has advocated for a nationwide referendum on the issue. The
government has responded that all is necessary is a 2/3 majority in
Parliament.
The debate over whether to adopt the CCJ has inevitably raised issues
of nationalism and self-determination. One of the most hotly debated
questions is whether a Caribbean Court should create its own jurispru-
dence, or must instead strictly follow precedent set by the Privy Council.
Indeed, the Privy Council leaves a complex legacy regarding the applica-
tion of binding law in national Caribbean courts. On the one hand, the
Privy Council was the only judicial body serving a multitude of Caribbean
nations with the power to create binding law. A Caribbean Court of Ap-
peals could unite the national legal systems of the ESC countries.211 On
the other hand, the precedent that is already in place from the Privy Coun-
cil is unlikely to be overturned en masse by the Caribbean Court of Jus-
tice. The adoption of the CCJ does not guarantee a proliferation of death
sentences and executions. Certain authors have speculated that the princi-
ple of stare decisis, enshrined in the tradition of English Common Law,
will temper any willingness to rely on the death penalty.212 The decisions
rendered by the Privy Council, including Pratt v. Morgan, would not be
completely disregarded by the CCJ in its determination of death penalty
cases. Even if the Privy Council is abolished, its rulings will still be consid-
ered active precedent and binding law by courts of all levels throughout
the Caribbean.
If the CCJ is adopted, it will have to engage in a complex balancing
act. It will have to consider the rulings of the Privy Council while also
reflecting the will of the people it serves. The ruling in Pratt, although
designed to enforce human rights obligations, had the unfortunate effect
of allowing London to dictate policy to ESC countries. ESC governments
and people alike felt the binding ruling in Pratt created an impossible situ-
ation for the administration of the death penalty. The Pratt decision
209. Chris Summers, Jamaica’s London Appeal Court Dilemma, BBC NEWS (Aug. 2,
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-18668861.
210. Id.
211. Birdsong, supra note 163, at 206 (“Rarely in Courts of Appeal throughout the
region will one see lawyers citing or quoting an appellate case from another Caribbean coun-
try unless that case was decided before the Privy Council. The result of this reliance on the
judgments of the Privy Council is a notable absence of precedents in the region.”).
212. Id. at 224-225 (“It is this author’s belief that even if the Privy Council no longer
exists, the concept of stare decisis will moderate a rush to the death penalty. . . .The concept
of stare decisis is written into the Agreement to Establish the CCJ. . . The Privy Council, over
the years, has interpreted the constitutions of Jamaica and Trinidad in a way that moderates
the imposition of the death penalty. Both Pratt and Morgan and Roodal v. State are now
constitutional requirements that must be followed.”).
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greatly narrowed the operation of the death penalty by invalidating the
time limits states had attempted to impose on tribunals and staying all
executions while petitions were pending.213 The time frame imposed by
Pratt made it difficult for Caribbean states to permit human rights peti-
tions to be heard in a “reasonably deliberative amount of time.”214 The
Privy Council was heavily criticized for refusing to adopt an incremental
approach to the overhaul of the capital appeals process. One historian
stated that this enormous judicial restructuring of the Caribbean death
row forced a “new legal norm . . . upon a resistant legal and political
culture.”215
Indeed, Professor Bogues thinks that the Caribbean Court of Appeals
is not a final jurisprudential break from colonialism, but rather an over-
view and repeal of colonial laws, which still reside on the books.216 The
adoption of the Caribbean Court of Justice is just one piece of a needed
comprehensive legal reform for ESC nations. Reforms need to be practi-
cal, including an effective public defender service, shorter time to trial, and
better police work.217 Most importantly, there needs to be a thorough re-
view of laws that have their roots in colonialism, including legislation on
vagrancy, drug policy, and homosexuality.218 The development of a Carib-
bean jurisprudence is crucial, but it cannot be “piecemeal.”219 Similarly,
Professor Gaspar points to education as a major factor in reforming the
legal system.220 People need to be educated about the role of the criminal
justice system in their own lives, including the benefits of the Caribbean
Court of Justice and the Privy Council. Professor Gaspar describes this as
the process of “ventilating” issues within the context of popular opin-
ion.221 The formula for political and judicial change requires informed in-
put from the general public.
Yet another source of support for the Caribbean Court of Justice has
come from a seemingly unlikely place: the Privy Council. Judges on the
JCPC have stated publicly that it is important for the Caribbean to have its
own supreme court and develop its own jurisprudence. Sir David Sim-
mons, Chief Justice of the Barbados Supreme Court and President of the
Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission of the CCJ stated: “The
Privy Council and the House of Lords judges fully understand the neces-
sity for the CCJ, fully support what we’re doing and pledged their contin-
ued support for the court.”222
213. Helfer, supra note 110, at 1889.
214. Id.
215. Id.




220. Gaspar Interview, supra note 44.
221. Id.
222. Birdsong, supra note 163, at 220.
246 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 35:213
B. Accessibility and Costs of the Privy Council and CCJ
Another major consideration in the adoption of the CCJ is cost. The
cost dilemma functions on two levels: the expense of appeals to the Privy
Council and the operational costs of the CCJ. Each signatory gave a one-
time contribution to the fund establishing the CCJ. Trinidad was the larg-
est contributor to the fund, giving an initial sum of TT 199 million. Trini-
dad also agreed to provide a home for the court in its capital of Port of
Spain and fund the ongoing costs of its operation.223 It has been predicted
that Jamaica would contribute $28.7 million to the fund,224 while Guyana
would contribute $47.8 million.225 The other amounts, given by smaller
ESC countries, amounted to approximately $2.5 million.226 The govern-
ment of Japan also contributed to $300,000 to the establishment of the
CCJ through their Human Resource Development Fund.227 But major
questions remain about how the operations of the court will continue to be
financed. Many of the ESC nations that are considering adoption of the
CCJ are developing nations with scarce financial resources.228 CARICOM
projections have stated that the cost to operate a six-judge Caribbean
Court of Justice would be approximately $EC 4 million per year. Trinidad,
Jamaica, Guyana, and Barbados would undoubtedly pay the largest share
of maintenance for the court, although only Barbados is a current member
of the CCJ.229 Conversely, the salaries of the Privy Council judges and
other costs associated with the court are paid for by the Commonwealth.
Retention of the Privy Council has been a relatively cheap proposition for
ESC countries.230
Although the Privy Council requires little funding from ESC coun-
tries, there are obstacles to accessibility. First, the cost of appeals to the
Privy Council is almost prohibitive for the majority of citizens in the ESC.
To file an appeal with the Privy Council, an individual would have to pay
223. Although Port of Spain was designated as the temporary home of the court, it has
not since relocated.
224. CCJ Loan To Be Repaid Over 10 Years, JAMAICA OBSERVER (Aug. 14, 2003),
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20030813T200000-0500_47526_OBS_CCJ_
LOAN_TO_BE_REPAID_OVER____YEARS.asp.
225. Patrick Denny, Ten-Member Team for Caribbean Court of Justice Seminar in Trin-
idad, Guyana to Contribute US$47-8M to Court, STABROEK NEWS (July 20, 2002), http://
landofsixpeoples.com/news022/ns207203.htm.
226. Felicia Toby, CCJ Will Be a Reality, BARBADOS ADVOCATE (Sept. 9, 2003), http://
www.barbadosadvocate.com/newviewnewsleft.cfm?record=14858.
227. Caribbean Court of Justice Technical Assistance US$300,000 Agreement Signed
with Japan, STABROEK NEWS (Aug. 21, 2002), http://landofsixpeoples.com/news022/ns208213.
htm.
228. Bryan, supra note 40, at 209.
229. Id. (“At a recent meeting of regional Attorneys General, several options for fund-
ing the Court of Appeal were discussed. One option proposed the following distributions:
Jamaica 35.7 percent ($EC 1.5 million), Guyana 10.6 percent ($EC 444,000), Barbados 15.6
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attorney fees, airfare, and other costs to send their attorney to the United
Kingdom.231 Lord Anthony Gifford QC, an English hereditary peer and a
barrister who set up a law firm in Jamaica in 1991, put it well when he
stated: “I’m in favour of the move to the CCJ. It would be far more acces-
sible. At the moment the only people who can appeal to the Privy Council
are those with a lot of money or those with none, who are on Death
Row.”232
The reason for the prominent number of capital appeals is that many
prisoners facing the death penalty have secured pro bono representation
from lawyers in London.233 Yet for those unable to get high-quality pro
bono representation in death penalty cases, it is extremely difficult to file
an appeal with the Privy Council. Junior lawyers assigned to these cases
through national legal aid systems, are unprepared to handle the complex-
ity of capital cases. Legal aid programs also do not provide adequate train-
ing to their younger lawyers and do not pay them to assist their clients
during specific pretrial and post-trial proceedings.234 Further, lawyers are
often unable to gather the appropriate forensic, investigative, or medical
expertise to make a compelling case at trial.235 The CCJ will be less costly
and more accessible as an appellate court serving all of the ESC countries.
C. Can the CCJ be a Truly Independent Judiciary?
One of the strongest arguments for the Privy Council is its ability to
function as an impartial arbiter of the law. The judicial integrity of the
Privy Council is maintained by its remoteness from the regional political
conflicts of the Caribbean.236 Supporters of the Privy Council have noted
that, “the Caribbean has often seen the geographic and social distance of
the Privy Council as a calming and stabilizing influence.” Legal elites have
come in force to support the Privy Council.237 The Jamaican Bar, for ex-
ample, is one organization that has consistently supported use of the Privy
Council. Within the Jamaican Bar, there is a small but powerful group of
231. Giselle Reid, The Legacy of Colonialism: A Hindrance of Self-Determination, 10
TOURO INT’L L. REV. 277, 300 (2000) (“An inaccessible court is, arguably, a denial of an
inherent constitutional right to justice. A regional Caribbean court of last resort would un-
doubtedly be more accessible and more affordable to the average person than travelling to
the Privy Council.”).
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attorneys who are fiercely loyal to the JCPC.238 Dr. Paul Ashley, a Jamai-
can attorney and political commentator, notes a strong intersection be-
tween the pace of decolonization and the reliability of English judges.
Ashley believes that Jamaicans are reluctant to put issues of local justice in
the hands of Caribbean judges. “The feeling, he says, is ‘better to let it
remain with the tried, tested and proven British.’ “239
Privy Council judges are also seen as more experienced than their
counterparts in the ESC.240 This experience, combined with the remote-
ness of their office, ensures that they are fully insulated against the politi-
cal and social pressures of a small, politically and socially intimate region
like the Caribbean.241 Jamaican attorney Hugh Wildman, a former senior
prosecutor in Jamaica, asserted in 2012 that regional governments should
use utmost caution in their attempts to replace the Privy Council with the
Caribbean Court of Justice. “I am not confident or comfortable that we
are going to replace the Privy Council with a court of equal standing in
terms of erudition . . . It is my considered view that the quality of the
judgments given by the Privy Council are far superior to what we are see-
ing in the region and for that matter what we are seeing coming out of the
CCJ.”242 In a swift response, Patrick Atkinson, the current Attorney Gen-
eral, defended Caribbean judges: “I reject completely any suggestion that
the decisions coming out of our courts are inferior to decisions coming out
of the English courts.”243
Yet the CARICOM agreement establishing the CCJ has a mechanism
for reducing the role of politics in the appointment of judges.244 The
Agreements states that Caribbean politicians have no power to appoint or
remove judges from positions at the CCJ. Instead, judges will be ap-
pointed by “a majority vote of all the members of the [Regional Judicial
and Legal Services] Commission.”245 The Agreement establishing the
Court delineates specific guidelines for the appointment of judges. The
signatory countries determined that CCJ judges should not be directly ap-
pointed by member states or elected by the citizenry of the Caribbean.
The CCJ agreement created a regional ‘Judicial and Legal Services Com-
238. Rowe, supra note 196.
239. Summers, supra note 210.
240. Helfer, supra note 110, at 1867 (The Privy Council was staffed with “able common
law judges,” a fact that helps to explain why Caribbean Legal elites supported it.).
241. Bryan, supra note 40, at 204 (“Conversely, jurists from the region, despite their
integrity and independence, may find it difficult if not impossible to be uninfluenced, due to
the small size of the region and the fact that it proves almost impossible to keep the business
of one person private from that of another. This concern is part of the reason that there is
some division as to whether the Caribbean Court of Appeal should handle only criminal
appeals.”).
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mission’ that chooses the judges of the court. The Commission was de-
signed to insulate the judges of the CCJ against political influence or bias
from different Caribbean nations.246 To qualify as a judge for the CCJ, an
individual must have at least five years of judicial experience and “good
moral standing.” The President of the CCJ is appointed “by a three-
fourths majority vote of the States upon recommendation of the Commis-
sion.”247 Judges are allowed to serve indefinitely, without a limit to their
terms. Judges, however, cannot serve past the age of seventy-two years
old.
Professor Bogues and Professor Johnson both believe that Caribbean
judges are not more partial to political influence or professionally unquali-
fied than judges in other countries. Professor Bogues cited the life-term
appointment of federal judges in the United States as one example.248
Similar to the appointment process in the United States, it is nearly impos-
sible to have the appointment of judges be free of political influence.249 It
is unreasonable to think that judges just magically appear in office, as if
they “sprang from the head of Zeus.”250 Similarly, Professor Johnson
notes that there are a number of outstanding legal minds in the Carib-
bean.251 But the opportunity for these jurists to fully exercise their influ-
ence can never fully be realized while the Privy Council still functions as
the highest court of appeal in the Caribbean.252 Professor Johnson notes
that the Privy Council is composed of men who are experts on Caribbean
law, but have little idea of “what is happening in the Caribbean.” The
Caribbean judiciary has “fought fiercely for their autonomy over the
years,” and on the whole, the judiciary has been fairly autonomous. A link
with England’s legal training clearly exists, since many Caribbean lawyers
and judges were educated in England, but these groups have still managed
to maintain their own independence.253
Although the Caribbean Court of Justice has not seen many death
penalty appeals from the countries of Barbados, Guyana, and Belize, it has
heard one in its young tenure. In 2006, the CCJ was asked to hear an
appeal from the Lennox Boyce case, which originally came before the
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of the Judicial Services Commission from a signatory state, one local chairman of a public
service commission of a signatory state, two persons from civil society determined by re-
gional nongovernmental organizations, two “distinguished jurists” nominated by deans of
Caribbean law schools, and two person nominated jointly by the bar associations of the signa-
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Privy Council in 2004.254 The government of Barbados asked the CCJ to
overturn the sentence of the Privy Council, which had commuted the
death sentence to life imprisonment. The CCJ refused to do so, stating
that the Privy Council’s decisions will continue to be binding until the CCJ
finds that they must be overturned.255 This decision has lent credence to
the belief that the CCJ can, in fact, be a neutral arbiter of the law in the
English Speaking Caribbean.
CONCLUSION:
In the English Speaking Caribbean, current governance is impacted by
the weight of the colonial past. The British ruled the region for close to
400 years, leaving an enormous influence on political and legal institutions.
They implemented systems of punishment, including the death penalty,
and established a supreme court for the region, the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council. Although most ESC nations received their indepen-
dence in the 1960s, they retained the JCPC as their court of appeal. Over
the years, significant rulings by the JCPC on the death penalty have cre-
ated a local backlash against continued judicial imperialism. Rulings like
Pratt and Lambert Watson made it difficult for Caribbean countries to re-
tain their human rights obligations and respond to rising rates of violent
crime.
Many of the dilemmas faced by ESC countries in their application of
the death penalty can be traced directly back to colonialism. Application
of the death penalty is not illegal under international law, and independent
nations throughout the world should have the right to determine their own
matters of governance and self-determination. The Privy Council also has
not formally come out against the death penalty, but has restricted proce-
dure to such a degree that it is functionally impossible to impose. Consid-
ering the length of the appeals process in the ESC, it is impossible for a
plaintiff to exhaust the process within the mandated five-year window
from Pratt. Courts have been placed under enormous strain by this deci-
sion and the present volume of capital appeals, especially legal human
rights bodies that only meet a few times per year. The decisions by the
Privy Council have actually had the effect of limiting the human rights
commitments of ESC nations, considering the pressure on the appeals pro-
cess and strong popular support for the death penalty throughout the ESC.
Caribbean countries are unlikely to abolish the death penalty anytime in
the imminent future.256
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The answer to this complicated problem can be found in ESC coun-
tries determining their own matters of governance. This can be accom-
plished through the adoption of the Caribbean Court of Justice. Provided
that ESC countries can resolve their internal political challenges, the CCJ
would allow countries to re-establish their human rights commitments and
create their own binding precedent on issues like the death penalty. Local
control over law in the ESC would calm nationalist feelings about the co-
lonial legacy and judicial intervention from Britain. The abolition of ap-
peals to the Privy Council and the creation of the CCJ are the final steps
to ending colonial influence and attaining true independence.
status quo. So the death penalty remains, and is likely to remain for some time, the penalty
for murder throughout the region.”).

